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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON**

COPY NO. 10

June 19, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Defense Mobilization Plan D-Minus

REFERENCES: A. Memo for NSC, May 29, 1957
B. Record of Meeting of Planning Board,
June 17, 1957

The enclosed draft Planning Board comments and recommendations on Mobilization Plan D-Minus, as tentatively agreed on at the meeting on June 17, are transmitted herewith for further consideration by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, June 21, 1957.

MARION W. BOGGS
Director
NSC Secretariat

cc: Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

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D R A F T
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
BY THE NSC PLANNING BOARD
on
DEFENSE MOBILIZATION PLAN
D-MINUS

(Memo for NSC, May 29, 1957)

1. Capability Assumptions. The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Capability Assumptions" (Part I-A, pp. 1-2) are suitable as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review.

2. Weapons Effects. The Planning Board recommends that the Council agree that the "Weapons Effects" section (Part I-B, pp. 3-26), being of a highly technical nature, should be subject to continuing review and concurrence for technical accuracy by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense (AFSWP), the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Public Health Service), including their medical representatives.

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3. Situation Assumptions: The Attack. The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Situation Assumptions -- The Attack" (Part I-C, pp. 27-29) are suitable (except as noted below) as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review:

a. With reference to para. 5 of this section, the Planning Board believes that the assumed range of nuclear weapons to be employed should be from a few kilotons to several megatons.

b. With reference to the tabulation in para. 6 of this section, the CIA Adviser believes that a more useful assumption would be a ratio of two or three nuclear radiation casualties to one blast and thermal casualty. The Office of Defense Mobilization will review the ratios in this tabulation with the staff of the NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

c. Plan D-Minus does not assume that the USSR will use its capability to employ bacteriological and chemical agents in an attack.

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It seems to me the best concept
 is that the line and nominal
 command should be in the civil
 mayors, governors etc and that the
 FCDA people should operate as the
 German General Staff officers did as
 advisers whose advice must be
 taken on all matters within their professional
 competence and who have their own
 means of communication to GHQ.

I think The FCDA boys locally
 are better known than thinks.

STAT

Also ~~last~~^{some} states have delegated or
 plan to delegate emergency functions to

have understood in mass that
your proposition is already in being.
Perhaps it is not formalized.

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4. Situation Assumptions: Post Attack Analysis. The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that the "Situation Assumptions -- Post Attack Analysis" (Part I-C, pp. 30-43) are suitable ~~(except as noted below)~~ as a basis for defense mobilization planning for a surprise attack on the continental United States, it being understood that the assumptions will be subject to continuous change and review.

a. The Office of Defense Mobilization will review with the Public Health Service the assumptions as to communicable diseases in para. 15 of this section.

5. Policy Assumptions; Actions by the President.* The Planning Board recommends that the "Policy Assumptions" (Part I-D, pp. 44-47) and "Actions by the President" (Part III, pp. 79-90):

a. Should indicate a greater degree of decentralization of government authority to State and local governments in the immediate post-attack period.

b. Should indicate greater emphasis upon the maintenance of law and order among the civil population in the immediate post-attack period.

c. Should indicate that in the immediate post-attack period, available armed forces should assist State and local governments, on their request, in maintaining law and order.

*Planning Board members should review these sections in order to (1) correct errors, (2) supply omissions, and (3) reduce, if possible, the number of Presidential actions required.

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6. Definitions. The Planning Board did not review the definitions (Part I-E, pp. 47-52) and recommends no action thereon by the Council.

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